Balkans in 2019: Change Must Come from Within

The regional obsession with “positive signals” from the EU will not help. By spring, the current Commission will be a lame duck, awaiting the outcome of the European Parliamentary elections in May and the formation of a new Commission.

Escalation more likely than settlement in Kosovo:

A Serbian Ortodox priest looks on from a balcony during a speech of visiting Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic in the city centre of the northern Serb-dominated part of Mitrovica, Kosovo, 2018. Photo: EPA-EFE/DJORDJE SAVIC

No new projects or initiatives can therefore be expected. This leaves a very narrow window of opportunity for the EU-led Kosovo-Serbia dialogue, as any agreement would need to be complete by spring.

 This seems hard to imagine at the moment. Both Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic and the Kosovo government have been putting more emphasis on escalating their dispute than on cooperation. Both might believe they can achieve a better outcome with a new Commission and under Federica Mogherini’s successor.

Furthermore, in Kosovo no actors have the support to carry an agreement through at the moment and President Hashim Thaçi appears even weaker than he was a year ago. It is unlikely that he would secure support for a treaty with Serbia, even if there was one.

On the Serbian side, Vučić seems more interested in negotiating and escalating than in finding a settlement. After all, he has no interest in moving quickly.

Buying time could convince a new Commission to uncouple Kosovo talks from Serbia’s EU accession, especially if he does not seem like the culprit for the delay and if any quick settlement shifted the spotlight more towards the decline in democracy and rule of law in Serbia. Thus, escalation with a weaker EU to intervene seems more like the order of the day in 2019.

Macedonia’s reward for Greek deal unclear:

The main success of 2018 meanwhile has been the agreement between Macedonia and Greece. While it is not yet guaranteed to cross the final hurdles in both countries, it seems more likely to succeed than to fail.

The agreement is the most significant good-faith effort to resolve a core regional dispute for a while. What remains unclear is whether Macedonia will receive a reward from the EU for its efforts. While NATO membership seems likely by 2020 at the latest, the more important goal of moving European integration forward is less certain.

The skepticism of some EU members about enlargement in general might yet throw a spanner in the works of the enlargement process and in getting accession talks started next summer for Macedonia and for Albania. This risk highlights the fact that EU accession is not only based on the progress made by the aspirant countries but also on the willingness of existing EU members to move accession forward.

No Enlargement Commissioner possible next year:

Populists and nationalists will be stronger in the next European Parliament, to be elected in May, though the shifts are likely to be less dramatic than the shifts the European political landscape has seen already in recent years.

Some of the far-right parties will oppose enlargement so that the new parliament will be more reserved towards enlargement and the EU in general.

This skepticism will be reflected in the Commission, although it will be likely to include the large centrist European parties, the Socialists, the European People’s Party, and the Liberals.

It is possible that the new Commission will not even have a Commissioner on Enlargement. Considering the steady decline of the enlargement portfolio over the past 15 years, this would be no surprise.

This would send a wrong signal, but the possibility needs to be considered. Having no Commissioner for Enlargement would reflect the lower priority given to enlargement, but would not change the existing reality in the EU.

Furthermore, having a commission from the “wrong” country could be worse. If Hungarian commissioner were in charge of enlargement, for example, he or she could do more damage to enlargement than not having a commissioner at all.

Most enlargement skeptics are already worried that enlargement would import more versions of Viktor Orban into the EU, or more Romanias and Bulgarias. Thus, having a Commissioner from there would reaffirm that worry.

EU still supporting regional strongmen:

Over the past few years, the EU and its member states have done some good, but also some harm, to the region.

Consider the strong support for regional strongmen and the sabotage for the rule of law, including Hungary offering asylum to Nikola Gruevski, the convicted former prime minister of Macedonia.

One of the significant challenges for the EU is how to deal with members that openly flaunt the rule of law, including Hungary and Poland, but also Italy.

So far it has lacked the tools and, often, the political will to tackle this challenge. Instead, those breaking the rule of the EU cast a shadow, directly and indirectly, over the Balkans.  Consider the next summit of the Berlin Process scheduled for Poznan.

The decision to host the summit in Poland is at least as disastrous as the decision to hold this year’s summit in London. If one would want to empty the Berlin Process of meaning intentionally, one could not pick better places, except, maybe, Budapest.

The message from Britain and Poland is in both cases, “Do as we say, but don’t do as we do”, i.e., leave the EU or break its rules.

The Romanian EU presidency also had some intentions to include the Western Balkans in the Sibiu summit planned for May, but that appears increasingly doubtful.

In short, change and a push for a positive transformation are unlikely to come from the EU in 2019.

This might be sobering, but also important: as democratic decline and EU accession have gone hand in hand in recent years in the Western Balkans, it is clear that getting closer to the EU is no longer a sure way to increase the level of democracy; Europeanisation and democratization are no longer in sync.

Such a trend does not mean societies should give up on EU integration, as some nationalist parties in the region suggest. Instead, the transformation towards more pluralist, democratic societies has to come from within.

Considering the stagnation and decline of democracy in the region, not least in Serbia, except for Macedonia; the challenge is clear.

Strongmen across the region enjoy attention and support from the EU and other world leaders while they can gradually erode democratic and independent institutions and media at home.

There is no sign that they will face greater pressure from the outside. Even in Macedonia in 2015, when everybody could listen to the recordings of a corrupt government that spied on its citizens, pressured courts and manipulated media, the pressure came from within, and only later, belatedly, from the EU and the US. Civil society and opposition parties carried the main burden. In the region and in particular in Serbia, pressure for more democracy and the rule of law will have to come from the societies themselves.

Florian Bieber is the coordinator of the Balkans in Europe Advisory Group and professor for Southeast European History and Politics at the University of Graz, Austria. The reflections are based on discussions held in Belgrade on 14 December on the EU and the Balkans in 2019 organized by the European Western Balkans and the European Fund for the Balkans. He tweets at fbieber.